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Kiel Working Paper No. 862
Provision of Public Goods, Voting and Agglomerative Bias
by
Andreas Kopp
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the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1 Introduction
This paper adds to the literature in local public finance originating from
the work of Tiebout (1956) on the claim that decentralised decisionmaking
would lead to a first best allocation both of households to jurisdictions and
of local public goods within each community. A vast and powerful
literature exists stating the precise conditions under which the hypothesis
holds (Scotchmer 1994, Rubinfeld 1987). Central assumptions of the
existence of the first best solution is the assumption of a free entry of new
communities and of complete information of local governments on the
preferences of potential members and their ability to simultaneously
choose the membership and local public good allocation (Starrett 1993).
If these assumptions are relaxed the preferences of the members of a
community are not revealed by the households' choice of their favourite
jurisdiction. Local governments and households are then confronted with
incomplete information on future compositions of the communities in
terms of the preferences of the member households and future allocations
of local public goods. Local governments then depend on a political
decision making process to elicit the residents' preferences. We assume
that local governments aggregate individual preferences by majority
voting. That is, each moving phase of the consumers will be followed by avoting phase and a subsequent adjustment of the supply of public goods by
the local governments. The potential migrants decide on their residential
locations on the basis of expectations on future fiscal policies. The
necessity and consequences in case of a limited number of community sites
of a voting process on community choice has been analysed by several
authors in a non-spatial context (cf. Wildasin 1986) This two stage process
of moving and voting has also been studied only for a non-spatial setting
(Starrett 1993). A bias in spatial club size has previously been assessed for
the case of a Tiebout tax. We show that if we relax the strong
informational conditions of this literature that a size bias results for the
case of the taxation of land rents, too. In contrast to the cited literature we
dispense with the assumption of a continuum of agents in each
community.
Tiebout (1956) suggested that the freerider problem of the provision of
non-excludable, non-rival goods could be solved by viewing the provision
of public goods in a system of numerous jurisdictions as being analogous
to a competitive market for private goods: Competition between
communities would ensure that a variety of bundles of public goods is
* On the problems resulting from the assumption of a continuum of agents in Tiebout
type models cf. Berliant and Raa (1991).produced, and individuals would reveal their preferences for public goods
by moving ("voting with their feet"). In contrast to pure public goods with
monotonically decreasing average costs the local public goods in the
Tiebout model are produced with U shaped average cost curves with
respect to community size. The competition between the communities
would achieve efficiency in maximising the benefits of their members from
the provision of public goods within the community and would force all
communities to supply the public good at minimum cost.
Having perfect information on the different packages of public goods
and taxes offered by a sufficiently large number of existing or potential
communities households move to that jurisdiction where they realise their
optimal plan to consume public and private goods. As there is no private
production, and hence no labour market, and no mobility costs, individuals
respond only to fiscal conditions. In the original Tiebout model there are
no jurisdiction specific fixed resources.
If there is a heterogeneous population with respect to preferences and
initial endowments it is, however, not clear how the competition process
leads to an efficient outcome. Even if there were as large a number of
jurisdictions as there are household types and the number of each
household type could be divided by the optimal community size, the localgovernments would have to know the preferences of the population of all
potential jurisdictions, coordinate plans among each other to decide which
fiscal package to offer and immediately establish the equilibrium. Local
governments would then have exactly the informational problems the
Tiebout model claims to solve. Only then would all jurisdictions contain
identical agents and a political decision process of the community in
question be of no relevance: All members would have identical
preferences.
If local governments have to seek support in elections they could do so
with respect to the current population or, via an active immigration policy,
try to influence the future composition of the community's population. If it
is impossible to achieve an ultimate complete segregation of the total
population according to household types (e.g. because of a finite number
of community sites), or governments do not believe the process to lead to
that absorbing state, we face an adverse selection problem for the latter
political strategy. To avoid these complications we assume that the
government resolves the disagreement over budgetary policy because of aheterogeneous population by a majority rule voting process (cf. e.g.
Westhoff 1977).!
In section 2 the basic analytical framework will be presented. We
explicitly take account of a land market. To argue for the taxation of land
rents in the spatial context we analyse the optimal plan of the political
decision maker if there were a complete segregation of the population
according to types.
In section 3 we model migration decisions of the households,
employing an overlapping generations model, and derive the temporary
voting equilibrium.
2 Optimum taxation for spatial clubs and perfectly mobile
households
2.1 Preferences of households
In the model we will use a local community is identified with a spatial
club. A nonrivalrous collective good is to be shared by the members of a
community living around it. To enjoy the collective good one must visit it.
The cost of visiting it (in terms of a private consumption good) per unit
As has been shown by Bewley (1981) this could lead to an inefficient lock in of the
competition process, (see also the modified example in Stanrett 1988, sec. 5.3).distance is assumed to be fixed. When households occupy space, one
individual's use of space precludes another's use of the same space. This
fact of spatial separation introduces an element of "club rivalry".
Besides the collective consumption good the agents consume a
composite private good. The nonexcludable collective good enters the
preferences of all members of a community symmetrically. Rivalry enters
as a nonexcludable item. None of the households can be isolated from the
effects of crowding.
People can choose the number of trips and the amount of land
occupied. The total land of a jurisdiction is divided into a set of zones
which are indexed by the variable s. Land within one zone is treated as
homogeneous and perfectly divisible. L(s) denotes the amount of land in
zone s. Each household must locate in a single zone. Assuming that the
allocation within a zone satisfies standard convexity assumptions every
agent in a particular zone will get the same allocation.
With these principles in mind we employ the following representation





g represents the nonexcludable element of the collective good under
study, T]
1
1 the individual use level of the public good, n(s) the number of
residents in zone s. L(s)/n(s) = l(s) denotes the amount of land occupied byresidents in zone s. c
h indicates the consumption of the private good. It
enters the utility function as the negative value of the initial endowments
net of the period consumption.
The costs of the provision of the public good F(g) will only depend on
the type of facility, indicating that there is no "service rivalry" apart from
the rivalry caused by the spatial separation of the households.
2.2 The social planners problem
To find out which form of taxation the government should choose to
finance the local public good we first study the governments decision
problem for the case of a homogeneous population.
To maximise the welfare of the representative household of zone s the
social planner maximises the utility function of a representative agent of
zone s subject to the following constraints
U
L(s)
> U for each s (2)
n(s)
(3)
= 0 (4)Constraint (2) says that the utility of each household of a particular type
should be independent of the zone it lives in. 1 The second constraint, with
x being a counting variable for the zones, says that the sum of the number
of residents in the individual zones must add up to the total number of
members of that community n. Restriction (4) is the material balance
equation. <})[s] is the transport cost (from s) per unit use of the public
facility.
Assigning (3[s], v and [X as Lagrangian multipliers to solve the
constrained maximisation problem to the constraints (2), (3) and (4),
respectively, and using first order conditions for the numeraire c to




On the problem that a first best solution would require an unequal
treatment of equals in this spatial context and the reasons for the choice
of a formulation that treats equals equally c.f. Starrett (1988). The
unequal treatment would be particularly difficult to enforce in a
democratic society as it is assumed here.dU"[s]/dl L[s] | | r5i + ^. = ( dU
h[s]/dc n[s] \x
v = 0. (8)
The first of these conditions says that r\ should be allocated just as any
other private good. Condition (6) indicates that g should be allocated like
any nonexcludable item. The third condition refers to the allocation of
land. Aggregating over the whole population, by multiplying each of these
equations with the appropriate n(s), summing and substituting from the
material balance equation (4) we obtain
7B
hU[x]/dc(s) \i
n denotes the total number of residents in the jurisdiction. v/\x is the value
of an extra resident in that community. If the jurisdiction has optimal size v
is equal to zero. The cost of the public good is financed by fully taxing the
pseudo land rents. This leads to the following lemma we use in subsequent
sections.
Lemma: Governments will finance local public goods for a spatial club by
taxing rents of a fixed local resource. If land is that fixed resource pseudo
land rents are the tax base.10
2.3 Decentralization of spatial clubs
2.3.1 Household behaviour
In this section we characterise the household decisions when the provision
of local public goods is decentralised. If we cannot assume that for each
type of household, defined in terms of its preferences and endowments
with the composite consumption good, the utility maximising community
exists at the outset jurisdictions will have heterogeneous populations. We
start by studying the moving phase where households choose their
community of residence. We analyse a situation where the process of
moving, voting and reoptimisation of the supply of public goods has not
reached an absorbing state.
1 We maintain the assumption that space
generates the only element of rivalry. The households know that the local
governments will finance the supply of the public goods by fully taxing the
land rents. Given the quality or type of public facilities g offered by the
jurisdictions the households then maximise utility with respect to the
consumption of the composite good c, the use of the public good r\ and the
plot size 1. All these variables depend on the zone s where the agent is
* On such a lock-in in a suboptimal allocation with heterogeneous populations for non-
spatial clubs cf. Bewley (1981).11
located. A household of type h residing in a zone of quality s then has the
following decision problem
max"U[g,c(s),l(s),T)(s)l . (10)
where r(g,s) is a bid rent function, subject to the budget constraint
c + r(g,s)l(s) + T}(s)<$>(s) = 0. (11)
The decision makers anticipate that the rent gradient will adjust so that
each agent will be indifferent concerning location. Potential residents of a
jurisdiction know that whatever rent structure will result total rents well be
used to finance the local public goods. That is, the dependence of r on g
must satisfy
)() r() (12)
Given this knowledge they see the land rent as a price for the provision
of the public good. Governments will, after each round of voting, offer a
level or quality of the public good satisfying these conditions.
First order conditions for the potential member's optimal decision lead
to
. each s (13)12
d"U/dl(s) , ,




That is, the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption good
and the use of the public good is equal to the transport cost per unit of the
public good. The rate of substitution between the consumption good and
the plot size is equalised to the land rent which in turn depends on the
supply of the local public good and the zone of residence. The second
condition (substituted back into the budget constraint) shows that the land
allocation within the jurisdiction should be that of a competitive land
market.
2.3.2 Government behaviour
Due to the absence of a complete spectrum of fiscal packages which would
allow for a complete segregation of household types and that there is no
immediate arrival at the overall equilibrium due to the governments'
incomplete information on the preferences the following violation of an






For the other households we have eitherBibliofhek des Institute





The former group would prefer a higher level of public goods supply and a
higher level of taxation, and the latter group would prefer a lower level of
the public good associated with lower (differential) land rents.
For {g
1, r'(g',s)} to be a voting equilibrium of community i the
following conditions must hold:
(18)
For at least half of the residents in community i must hold
d'V/dg
1







That is, at least one half of the households of the community in question
have a higher willingness to pay for the public good than the median voter;
the other half has a lower one. In what follows we use the agents'14
willingness to pay to order all households of the economy, h is then an
index varable of the willingness to pay for the local public good.
The multistage process of moving of agents, voting and a subsequent
reoptimisation by local governments would have reached an absorbing
state if there is a voting equilibrium and no household wants to switch to a
different community. As Westhoff (1977) has shown, in such an absorbing
state, if it exists, the communities are either composed of identical sets of
types of households or of single disjoint intervals of consumers. If such an
equilibrium is unique it is necessarily unstable (Westhoff 1979). Any
disturbance would lead to an adjustment process and a size bias as studied
in the subsequent section.
After a voting equilibrium has been identified and the supply of the
public services has been adjusted accordingly there are some consumers
who have an incentive to switch to a different community. This requires
that the density functions over types of households of different
communities are not identical and that the supports of these functions
overlap. Note that the density functions don't necessarily have full support,
i. e. not all types of individuals with respect to preferences for the local
public good must be represented in each community.15
3 Bias in the size of spatial clubs
Households take decisions whether to switch to a different community
after a voting phase which has taken place in all jurisdictions
simultaneously and fiscal packages have been implemented in accordance
with the median voter's optimality condition for the demand of the
nonrivalrous good. Without complete segregation of types or identical
distributions of households some of them may want to switch to a different
jurisdiction. The agents have information on the current voting equilibria
and the number of residents in all communities. In addition, they have
subjective beliefs about the distribution of types of households and
expectations on the migration streams into or out of the candidate
community they potentially move to. On the basis of this information and
these beliefs they form expectations about the new voting equilibrium that
will result after the moving phase. The local governments implement the
outcome of the voting phase without any regard to future changes of the
size or the composition of the population.
More precisely, we study the moving decisions in an overlapping
generations framework. We assume that members of each generation live
for two periods and that each generation that has died will be replaced by a16
new generation of identical agents. In each period there are "young
households", born in that period, and "old households" that have been born
one period before. After each voting phase households decide where to
move, maximising total expected utility.
We start by looking at two jurisdictions i € {1,11}. Let nit denote the
individuals born in community i in period t. It follows that nit and nm as
well as rij, and nj,+i are disjoint. In a situation-of no migration the
population in each community in period t is composed of the old agents
born in the previous period and those bom in period t, i.e. nu.i u njt.
Household types are sorted and indexed by their willingness to pay for the
local public good. The total spectrum of household types is then given by
the vector (hi, fi2, ...,hn). hi denotes the agent with the lowest willingness to
pay and hn the highest willingness to pay for the public good. We can then
characterise an individual by a triple {h, j, t}, with h e (hi, h2, ...,hn), j G
[1,11} and t=l,2,...,T.
To focus on the size bias resulting from the moving decisions, to avoid
the analysis of a stochastic process that will at best under restrictive
assumptions have an absorbing state and to take account of real world
limitations of the relocation decisions of potential migrants, we assume17
that only young households have the opportunity to move to another
jurisdiction.
Without loss of generality we assume that the voting equilibrium of
community II implies a smaller level of the supply of the public good than
the voting equilibrium of community one:







hi and hn denote the current voting equilibria. For the households of types
hi and hn the supply of the public goods after reoptimisation of the
governments will be optimal (in case of odd numbers of members, near
optimal otherwise) as the governments determine the optimal supply of
public goods gi* and gn from the equation18
—-. £i_ = ^L—l each s and i = 1,11 (20)
d
h"U/dc dgi
The further away the h of a certain household from the h of the voting
equilibrium the greater is the loss from not living in a homogeneous
community. If there were communities with both lower and higher values
of the voting equilibrium, the larger distance between the willingness to
pay of a household from that of the median voter the stronger would be the
incentive to switch to a different community. 1
Let
 h'v(g') denote the indirect utility function of household h in
community i enjoying the supply of the local public good according to the
preferences of the median voter. From the condition
 /l(v(g*)='V(g*) we can
determine the position of the marginal households indexed by hr° and hn°
which is indifferent between the current equilibria of community I and
community II. If the households were completely myopic the migration
decisions would directly follow from the comparison of the indirect
utilities that could be achieved in the two communities. The agents of
community i would migrate whenever
Note that only in the case of linear homogeneous utility functions we could measure
the burden of an individual from not living in a homogeneous jurisdiction by the





 V{^J). for i * j and i j = 1,11 (21)
Given the current voting equilibria households that might want to switch to
another community have an expectation function
(p,.(/i;) = Mj,, i,j € {1,11} and i * j (22)
with ht* being the vector of current equilibria and M, = (mimin,...,mjmax) the
vector of the number of migrants. Net outmigration streams have a
negative sign and net immigration streams have a positive sign. If for
example a potential migrant from community one assumed that all other
agents act myopically he or she would expect all residents of community II
with a lower h than hn to move to community I and all other agents of
community I with an h higher than hi to move to community II.
Depending on the actual distribution of types and the sizes of both
communities this might lead to an increase or a decrease of the voting
equilibria in both communities. If there were "normal" reactions of the
voting equilibria, i.e. hn moves up and hj moves down, those with the
weakest incentive to move have the highest probability of making mistakes
in the sense that they will have a lower indirect utility after moving than if
they had stayed in the home jurisdiction. The probability of making20
mistakes is the highest for those with a willingness to pay for the public
good close to the switching value.
Knowing the current equilibria and the numbers of residents in both
communities the consumers have subjective beliefs about the distribution
of types in the home community and the one they potentially want to
migrate to. We assume that they perceive these distributions as
multinomial distributions with parameters r\\ and Wj = (wihmjn,...,whmax), i =
I,II. nj corresponds to the number of residents in community i and Wj to the
vector of the a priori relative frequencies of types in community i. The
beliefs must be consistent with the current voting equilibria. The number
of types must be finite with k > 2. Types are mutually exclusive and
exhaustive. The sum of the parameters is equal to one. The subjective
probability of a particular vector of households of different types can then
be expressed as








The random vector (7tjmin,.--,rcimax) indicates the beliefs on the absolute
number of types in community i. The expected vector of absolute
frequencies of types is given by21
E(n) = niWi (24)





We further assume that the subjective beliefs on the parameters of the
multinomial distribution have the form of a Dirichlet distribution whose
parametric vector is a, = (aimin,...,airnax)' with the elements of a, being
positive integers. The random vectors Xj of the Dirichlet distribution
correspond to the weights of the multinomial distribution for community i
(DeGroot 1970). The Dirichlet distribution has the form
o/miB-l. aimx
•••-*/max






The potential migrants form their expectations on the post moving
multinomial distribution of types by updating the parameters using the
expected migration streams by type given by the expectation function (22).22
The new expected values for elements of the vector of parameters of the
multinomial distribution is obtained by adding the number of migrants to
the numerator of (27) (outmigrants with a negative sign) and adding the
total net flow of migrants to the denominator. The expected value of the
random parameter Xih then is
E\



















 /'imin '• = 'i.-min
Comparing this with the consistency requirement for the beliefs about the
initial distributions we obtain the expected difference between the initial
voting equilibrium hj* and the new voting equilibrium hj*\ Interpreting the
oc TCih/rii as h
 lh— and subtracting (25) from (29) we obtain, after
rearranging23
/l = /l* '' = ''/min V ft
/' = /',• min
From expression (30) we derive the following proposition
Proposition: The expected difference between the new and the old voting
equilibrium will be the c.p. be smaller
a) the higher the number of household types between the old and the new
equilibrium in the initial situation,
b) the higher the net migration for the types of households between the
median voter in the initial situation and the median voter in the new
equilibrium,
c) the smaller the change of the total population due to the moving phase,
d) the smaller the outmigration of households with a demand lower than
the demand of the median voter in the initial situation.
All these conditions hold for relatively large communities. That is, the
expected distance between the own ideal fiscal package and the ideal of the
median voter in the new voting equilibrium for household types between
those of the old and the new voting equilibrium is smaller when they move
to a relatively large jurisdiction. That is, would such a household of24
community I face a situation like the one depicted in Figure 1 and have the
choice between moving to community II or to another community III
which have equal initial voting equilibria but different sizes it would turn
to the larger community. This establishes the claim of the size bias in
spatial clubs even if the supply of the public good is financed by taxing
land rents.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that even if public goods in spatial clubs are financed by
taxing land rents that a size bias exists when some restrictive assumptions
of the original Tiebout model are removed. If a full equilibrium of all
household types segregating into different jurisdictions cannot be achieved
at the outset governments depend on a mechanism to elicit the preferences
of the households different from "voting with the feet". We assume
majority voting as such a mechanism. Both the governments and the
potential migrants face uncertainty with respect to future compositions of
the communities and the fiscal packages that will be implemented to
execute the outcome of the political process. We show that this uncertainty
favours relatively large communities.25
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